Farhang Erfani I believe that Levinas is fundamentally right in showing us that ethics requires a rupture in totality, in sameness. He is right in insisting that the difficulty of ethics lies in responding to the Other's challenge (and call), which shatters our horizon of the Same. Levinas would sharply criticize our post-9/11 tendency to suffocate otherness in the name of security; he would denounce our apprehension of risks, since there is no ethics without risk. My goal in this essay is to remain faithful to Levinas' original ethical insight, while providing a gentle critique. I would like to address a specific topic that I find neglected in his work-the ethical role of imagination, particularly utopianism-and show that despite Levinas' ambivalence, we ought to embrace the ethical importance of utopia. I submit that utopia is not yet another form of totality, as Levinas sometimes presumes, but that it is in fact a possibility of infinity, of changing the status quo.
I.
It is difficult to determine the relationship between Levinas and utopianism for two reasons. Levinas never addressed the topic directly, yet we find traces of it throughout his writings. More importantly, "utopianism" is loosely defined and has several meanings. It is sometimes understood as fantasy or escapist dream; to some, it is a political blueprint; to others, it is simply synonymous with idealism. Despite such difficulties, there have been noteworthy attempts at reconciling Levinas and utopianism. Miguel Abensour and Catherine Chalier are two Levinas scholars who have explored the connection between Levinas' philosophical and religious works and the utopian tradition; Lucy Sargisson, a utopian scholar, has recently approached Levinas as well, placing him among other postmodern thinkers who privilege the body and condemn suffering-themes dear to utopia.
2 Although these works deserve considerable attention, I wish to register two philosophical disagreements with their approaches. PhaenEx First, it is crucial to note that Abensour and Chalier use "utopia" rather loosely, often confusing it with eschatology or messianism. I tend to agree more with Sargisson and her analysis of utopia as "transgression," or what I will refer to as "intervention" in this essay.
Second, I think that it is a mistake to try to portray Levinas as a utopian thinker, for he was not one. 3 In fact, with the exception of a few scholars of the genre, most people use utopia as an insult. 4 In the same way no one cares to be called a fanatic, no one wishes to be labeled utopian either. I suspect that Levinas uses the term unsystematically because he was not primarily concerned with utopia. Contrary to Abensour's argument, Levinas was concerned, almost exclusively, with "ethics as first philosophy." It seems therefore ineffective to find the few passages where Levinas praises utopia, for there are others where he rejects it. In an essay entitled "Place and Utopia," in Difficult Freedom, he tells us that Utopia seems not just vain in itself, it is also dangerous in its consequences. The man of utopia wishes unjustly. Instead of the difficult task of living an equitable life, he prefers the joy of solitary salvation. He therefore refuses the very conditions in which his bad conscience had set him up as a person. He is nothing but Desire: disturbed by the dazzling day of his human conscience, he pursues a dream as though he were still sleeping, as though another day should dawn within his day, and with it another waking that would rid him of his suffocating nightmares (101).
Levinas fears those who sleep, those who like illusions and harmony in their lives; simply put, those who forget ethics. According to him, the man of utopia likes dreaming and sleepingthe ethical man is an insomniac. It "is precisely the encounter with the other human being that is a wake-up call for us" (Les imprévus de l'histoire 177). It is sometimes useful to be an insomniac, to refuse to dream. Images, imagination and utopia (could) keep us in an ethical slumber, a sort of "distraction" that Levinas denounces. In this light, imagination appears to be self-centered, cathartic for the self, cleaning up its conscience; it is "a form of disinterestedness" (Les imprévus de l'histoire 178). But I would argue that Levinas rejects the autonomous subject and not imagination in itself. The question should not be whether imagination is a slumber, but whether autonomy is; this is a subtle distinction that Levinas does not always make. In fact, he is sometimes too quick in grafting imagination to autonomy and seems to forget the ethical affect of imaginary works on his young self. 5 Couldn't imagination, at times, help the Other and promote heteronomy? In a different passage we can see Levinas denouncing again the passivity and the domination of the self, but this time he laments the absence of imagination:
The contemporary world, scientific, technical, and sensual, is seen to be without issue, that is to say, without God, not because everything is permitted and is possible by means of technology, but because everything is the same. The unknown immediately becomes familiar, the new, habitual. Nothing is new under the sun … Everything is absorbed, sunk, buried in sameness (Levinas Reader 245) .
Isn't it imagination's job to bring "something new under the sun" and challenge the selfcentered autonomous rule? In my view, these two passages are enough to show the inconsistency in Levinas-imagination is sometimes praised and sometimes denounced. Not being his main focus, Levinas rejects imagination and utopianism when they are unethical and harm the other;
he praises them when they work for the other. So the question for us should not be whether Levinas regarded utopia as ethical, but instead whether utopia can be ethical according to Levinas .
II.
We must dissociate utopianism and messianism. It is this association, in part, that has cost utopia its good name. The messiah, as traditionally conceived, comes back of his own volition-our job, until his arrival, is preparatory at best. But we cannot even prepare properly.
When the messiah comes, the current state of affairs will be changed, radically enough that we To illustrate this point, let us briefly turn to a famous canonical work of utopianism, Voltaire's Candide, 7 which is sufficiently well known and so there is no need here to go into its details. Candide epitomizes utopia at its best: a possibility against the domination of actuality. It is important to remember that Candide lived, at first, in a sort of utopia-the best of all possible worlds, in the best of all possible provinces of Westphalia, in the best of all possible castles, which of course had the best of all possible Barons and certainly the best possible young lady, named Cunegonde. Upon declaring his love for her, he was exiled from his little Garden of Eden, the good castle of Thunder-ten-tronch. Misery after misery, misadventure after misadventure,
Candide discovers the evils of the world, which he dissociates from his ideal home and his dreamy beloved. But when the world becomes "metaphysically, physically and morally unacceptable," Candide finds himself alienated in life. He tells us:
Where could I go? If I go back to my country, I'll find the Bulgars and the Avars slaughtering everyone in sight; if I return to Portugal, I'll be burned; if we stay here, we're in constant danger of being put on in a spit (Candide, ch. 17) .
This is when utopia is needed. Throughout the utopian tradition, beginning with Sir Thomas
More, utopia was always sought at the edge of the world, at the edge of the known-where no one had gone before, but where one had to go to escape the tyranny of the chartered territories (Kumar xx). So when Candide and his faithful companion have nowhere to go, they "place
[themselves] in the hands of Providence" by jumping in a river, which as it turns out takes them to the land of El Dorado. Shortly after his arrival, Candide the optimist-who has been ever so faithful to his original utopia-declares, "here's a better country than Westphalia." El Dorado is good to Candide and his companion; they are fed and received with unmatched hospitality.
Throughout their stay, Candide has a chance to reconsider his own original ideal by comparing the practices of his Westphalia and those of El Dorado. For instance, as he inquires about the religious practices of El Dorado, he is shocked to find out that there is no organized religion, and certainly no influence from religion on the politics of the city. With the unparalleled Voltairian irony, the naïve Candide exclaims: "What! You have no monks who teach, argue, rule, plot, and burn people who don't agree with them?" (Candide, ch. 18). Candide slowly discovers the existence of alternatives and other possibilities to what he took to be the only way of life. There is (or could be) a kind of place and a way of life that does not burn men for their religious beliefs.
We must notice that Candide decides not to stay in El Dorado. Like all other utopian stories, the value of El Dorado is not in itself, but in the difference that it made in the mind of the travelers who return to their own society. 8 The lesson of Candide's trip to utopia will be his ability to compare and contrast from then on. He admits that the castle of Thunder-ten-tronch is no longer "the finest place on earth" in his eyes. Throughout the rest of his adventures and his visits to many other countries, especially Voltaire's own France, Candide says without hesitation: "you can easily understand that after spending a month in El Dorado, a man has no interest in seeing anything else on earth" (Candide, ch. 21).
To go back to a more philosophical argument, we can see that Voltaire's Candide is a
fine example of what a utopia is meant to do:
Utopia here refers not only to a vision of a future society, but a vision pure and simple, an ability, perhaps willingness, to use expansive concepts to see reality and its possibilities. Mental breathing space might be necessary to sustain these sight lines (Jacoby 105).
Utopia historically was not meant to be a blueprint of a new world. It was a reflection on the current "here and now." It is true that throughout its historical changes, some authors, especially
Charles Fourrier and his followers, attempted to bring to life their imagined communities; they almost always failed. Their failure was frequently and unfortunately interpreted to mean that utopianism in general is impractical. This is not the place to argue in detail whether or not utopian communities of any sort should ever be attempted; I believe however that an attempt at their actualization has a role to play in the usefulness of utopias. But to go back to the kind of utopianism that dominated the genre, the imaginary model, we should add that there is a reason why, in the mind of its classical writers, utopia was never meant to be. Utopia after all is a no-place or no-space. If it does not exist in space, how could it ever exist in time? This of course does not mean that utopianism has no temporality; to the contrary, as Bloch insisted, it is about the "here and the now," as long as we understand the "now" not as eternal timelessness, but instead as timeliness. Utopianism is not about the society visited, but about the home society, the society to which the travelers will return and narrate the practices of this other place. Utopias function like mirrors reflecting the home-society's problems and the reflections in these mirrors provoke political reflection and reassessment in turn. 10 More's utopia, for one, depicted a society where men and women were free from social classes and wealth, and especially from religion. As with many other subsequent utopias that described a religiously tolerant society, the early utopians simply projected their hopes in this imaginary society. Cyrano de Bergerac-the author, not the character-who wrote The Comical
History of the States and Empires of the Worlds of Moon and Sun
, always desired to visit the moon and see the planet for which ours serves in turn as a moon. The moon, cosmically as well as politically our opposite, had neither a tyrannical king nor persecution. It looked very attractive compared to seventeenth century France, but Cyrano did not invite fellow Parisians to leave the earth for the moon; rather, he asked them to change the way they lived on earth.
To further point to why we cannot take the content of utopias as blueprints, but rather as How about other kinds of utopia? The communistic societies, which many utopias depicted, are said to be absolutely impossible and also undesirable. But when most utopians describe a communist society, significantly before Marx, they only describe the hope for equality and freedom. Had they lived in the twentieth century communist countries where men and women suffered from totalitarianism, they would have written about a society in which there is absolute personal freedom-as some have. 13 So it is foolish to condemn modern utopiasranging from sixteenth to nineteenth century-for their failed attempts, but rather should be looked at in light of their positive content. Many utopias were meant to be nothing other than criticisms of the writer's own state.
The genre has evolved in the twentieth century, witnessing the growth of dystopia-the opposite of utopia, depicting the disastrous place. The addition of this style to the canon not only fails to disprove the model, but it in fact reinforces it. No one longs for the kind of place that George Orwell describes in 1984, or the society that Ray Bradbury depicts in Fahrenheit 451.
These imaginary spaces, too, are about our current and existing practices. Indeed, their impacts have been on the here and now. Any time the government, or a major corporation, tries to extend its power and reach, we become nervous and cry out against "big brother." We must therefore abandon the perception according to which such works of imaginations were meant to be, and realize that the function of utopia is to provide us with alternatives and possibilities . Utopia is about the could; the ought is ethics' business.
III.
My goal is not to write a blank check to utopia. No doubt utopia, when misused, could be a formula for disaster. 14 What I hope to displace is the misperception of utopia as a blueprint of a world to come; instead we must see utopia as an intervention in this world on the behalf of the underrepresented and the absent. My argument is that Levinas' ethics is also a philosophy of intervention, quite compatible with utopia. As we will see, there is a need to differentiate between aesthetic intervention (however politically motivated) and ethical intervention-a difficulty that utopia cannot overcome on its own; ethics and even politics is urgently needed.
Levinas' work distinctively engages the philosophical tradition in the spirit of intervention. From his earlier writings, especially in Totality and Infinity, we see Levinas accuse the philosophical tradition of being too epistemologically driven, too concerned with knowledge, ontology and totality, and of losing sight of the ungraspable infinite. Philosophy, from its Greek origins, works axiomatically and needs closure and delimitation of its field. As Levinas puts it:
Perhaps the most essential distinguishing feature of the language of Greek philosophy was its equation of truth with an intelligibility of presence. By this I mean an intelligibility which considers truth to be that which is present or co-present, that which can be gathered and synchronized into a totality which we could call the world or cosmos.
According to the Greek model, intelligibility is what can be rendered present, what can be presented in some eternal here-and-now, exposed and disclosed in pure light (Ethics of the Infinite 185).
Although Levinas denounces this vision, this "pure light," he does not condemn vision tout court. Vision fails when it only sees a totality; it must learn to see the hidden, the absent-a difficult task for one's eyes, but therein lies the difficulty of ethics. Not surprisingly then, on several occasions, Levinas tells us that "ethics is an optics," a divine optics. Despite the ambiguity of the language of the divine, Levinas does not want us to see God per se, or at least not the theological God. God, meaning the infinite, the unknown, the other, is one of the names PhaenEx of that which Greek vision misses. 15 That is because there is no essential home of mine, not even god-given, that I cannot be asked to give up. No one has any metaphysical privilege. We are all essentially on the run and we all settle somewhere, but at the cost of taking something away from some other. This is why This calling into question, that Levinas names ethics, is found in the face of the other. PhaenEx
It would be easy to dismiss Levinas' claims as moralizing. The "face" is an engaging metaphor but it bears its own problems. In an interview with Levinas, Philippe Nemo tries to reduce the face to the actual features of another human being, reminding us of war stories that "tell us in fact that it's difficult to kill someone who looks straight at you," forgetting that for Levinas, the "best way to encounter the other is not even to notice the color of his eyes!" (Ethics and Infinity 85-86). There is nothing in the actual face that commands ethics. If it were so, we could imagine that some faces demand more of us than some others-as Levinas knows all too painfully, some thought that blue eyes were worth more than, say, brown ones. The reason the face is an interesting metaphor is because it means more than it shows. The ethics of the face is Descartes, the finite self has a notion of the infinite in his mind that he cannot have found on his own account; for Levinas:
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have an idea of infinity (Totality 51).
In The face in which the other … presents himself does not negate the same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the thaumaturgic supernatural. It remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it remains terrestrial. This presentation is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it (Totality 203).
IV.
Levinas seems to dissociate the face and the image in Totality and Infinity and reminds us that the "face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me." 18 But this does not mean that Levinas rejects image and imagination. The face is not reduced to its representation because any representation is my own doing and the face does more: it speaks and expresses itself-that, I cannot control. I agree with Simonne Plourde that the face beyond its image is "an expression," manifesting itself through language. It is not the expressed words that we ought to listen to as much as the "signification" of the other, expressed through language: "In manifesting himself through language, the Other confers a sense to his presence, presence that is both far and near, even more direct than the manifestation of the PhaenEx visible" (Plourde 23 Levinas was all too aware of the dangers of complicity and "collaboration," a concept particularly unsettling in post-war France. 20 To avoid becoming an accomplice and to avoid forgiving the other's violence for the sake of ethics and responsibility, Levinas introduces, all too briefly in Totality and Infinity, and more in depth in Otherwise than Being, the concept of the third party (le tiers). 21 In the presence of the other, all other others are co-present: "The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other" (Totality 213). The third party, my duty to all others, perhaps regulates my responsibility to the singular other, what Levinas calls the "incessant correction of the asymmetry of proximity in which the face is looked at" (Otherwise 158). I am responsible to the Other but I am also responsible to all Others. As Simon Critchley puts it:
the ethical relationship is troubled and becomes a problem with the entry of le tiers … from the first, my ethical discourse with the Other is troubled and doubled into a political discourse with all others … the ethical response given to the Other is given back to me in the form of a question, engaging me in a movement of reflection that takes place at the level of self-consciousness. The third party introduces a limit to responsibility (Ethics of Deconstruction 230-231).
This limit is justice. Justice is my responsibility to all others, to humanity to whom I must answer. Levinas' contribution is this doubling of our responsibility: we are always mediated between our ethical and our political obligations: "There is no just ethics without politics and there is no just politics without ethics. It is a question of the violence waged against violence in the name [of] the lesser violence" (Critchley, "Persecution" 9) . In the name of justice, I must either stand against the community for the sake of the other, or I must stand against the malicious other for the sake of the community. Not all utopias-broadly understood as imagined alternatives-are therefore acceptable. Levinas does not and cannot provide us with an axiomatic formula for when to be dutiful to the community and when to stand by the other. This is the difficulty of responsibility. This determination is historically and temporally guided. To lend our ear to alterity is our ethical duty; to accept it is a political decision.
Notes
*The comments from PhaenEx peer reviewers were wonderfully enlightening. I am also extremely grateful to Bree Del Sordo for her invaluable help.
